Sunday, October 21, 2012, Chandigarh, India

PART-VII
INDIA AND CHINA, 50 YEARS AFTERLessons learnt from ’62 war
The humiliating 1962 war with China made India lose face. Everything that could have possibly gone wrong, did. Flawed threat assessment, inadequate intelligence, ill-equipped military and poor diplomatic skills made it impossible to see what was coming. There are lessons to be learnt. India can ill afford a repeat and must modernise its forces, experts tell The Tribune

Be in a position of strength

The greatest lesson learnt from India’s 1962 war debacle is to get real with the Dragon. We can deal with China from a position of strength and not weakness or vulnerability. India needs to be militarily strong to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Credible deterrence will leverage its negotiating and bargaining position. This will enable India to command respect, not demand it. Like China’s idea of comprehensive national power, India’s capability should include not only its military strength, but also sustained economic growth and productivity, efficient governance, thoughtful and proactive diplomacy, democratic dividend and soft power.

India is passing through a churning process, but sooner its house is in order, the better it is. As an Asian power, China certainly has bounty of goodwill towards India, Buddhism being a cementing factor and the common fight against colonialism and imperialism being another denominator. These need to be leveraged mindfully by both sides. It should not be forgotten, however, that it is a one-party dominated state, which subscribes to the dictum that power flows from the barrel of the gun and it is the party that commands the gun.

One reason for the outbreak of the war was also the domestic political disorder in China. China can resort to a localised, short-lived war to divert its domestic attention and arouse nationalism. Only a credible deterrence will prevent it from embarking on any adventurism. Although it is claimed that the two countries are not rivals, it is a truism that the two Asian giants are vying for resources, markets and diplomatic space on a global scale and such competition, unless managed well, may lead to friction. It is imperative, therefore, that the two countries manage them creatively with care and concern.

Engage China cautiously

having served in the Indian Mission in China during the 1950s, I had a

ringside view of the events leading to the conflict. I recall Chinese Premier Zhou-En-Lai's visit to New Delhi in the early 1960s. The Chinese Premier believed in practising "real politics" compared to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who had a deep aversion for it. Despite being a great humanist, statesman and an honest person, the Indian leader was faulted for two decisions - taking the issue of Jammu and Kashmir to the UN Security Council under a clause that treated it as a dispute and the handling of China. Nehru's rather unguarded response at Chennai (Madras) airport en route Sri Lanka in October 1962 resulted in terrible consequences.

Asked by correspondents to respond to the thrust by the Chinese forces, Nehru responded that the Army had been asked to push them back. Up till then, as far as China was concerned, we were stronger. The then Defence Minister Krishna Menon's theory was that Pakistan, not China, was our enemy. Not a single non-aligned country came out in India's support, with New Delhi having to turn to the US and Britain.

But 2012 is not 1962. Both countries are nuclear powers and a full-scale war is not possible. Yet, two lessons should be learnt from that war - never to lower the guard and continue to engage with China. If India is used to thinking in a five-year cycle, the Chinese plan for 50 years, and they are not sentimental.

It is time for India to de-classify the Henderson-Brooks report, which remains in the vaults of the Defence Secretary's chamber in the South Block.

Be wary of opening up border

before launching border skirmishes with India in 1962, Mao Zedong told the Central Committee of the Communist Party that the response of China should be such that it should ensure three decades of peace in the border areas. Indeed, after the rout, India hardly ventured into the northern borders, barring the Nathu La defence in 1967 and the Samdurong Chu event in 1987.

Even today, with both sides modernising their armed forces, the Chinese side takes a stiff upper lip approach towards India. Apart from the psychological edge that China enjoys, the war left an indelible imprint on India. It kmows relations with China have to be conducted with caution.

India insists on China recognising Kashmir as a part of India, whenever Tibet or Taiwan issues are raised by Beijing. New Delhi insists on an issue-based working relationship with China. Until the border issue is resolved, India should be cautious of China’s proposals to open up border for trade or tourism. India keeps its powder dry by substantially improving its conventional and strategic military capabilities. Such capabilities are also utilised for natural disaster relief such as IAF sorties during the Sichuan earthquake; and convey that military capabilities can be used constructively and not just for humiliating the other side. China won the 1962 battle, but lost a partner in Asia.

Must know our weaknesses

the debacle has taught us how not to run the operations of a war (an obvious reference to 4 Corps chief Lt-Gen BM Kaul). One theatre commander was directly reporting to the Prime Minister and there was no chain of command.

The most rudimentary lesson one learnt as a boy scout was: “If you are not prepared, you will get a beating.” Somehow, we had not even assessed our own strengths and weaknesses. We should have known what were our weaknesses before launching an offensive. In war, every arm of the nation has to be involved, which wasn’t the case. To top it all, the Indian leadership failed to read the intentions of the Chinese. It was a gross mistake on our part to have misread the situation and all the assessments were wrong.

After so many years, it still rankles why air power was not used to counter the Chinese aggression. They had no airfields or air power in Tibet to run an air offensive campaign to counter the IAF or target Indian cities as being feared then. It was a strange decision to not have used air power. There are no explanations. The IAF could have stalled the invading land army by effective bombing.

Also as a country, we have failed to hold anybody accountable. Other than the then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, nobody was held responsible for the lapses. Today, there is no chance of a repeat of 1962.

Rise to China's economic stature

as the head of a party that was unified at the time of war, the CPI has its own understanding of the situation. We must try to understand why China with a better growth rate and wealth creation, does not have concentration of wealth in the hands of a few individuals.

The top 100 list of the world's richest persons does not have any Chinese while there are a few Indians. India should learn about the taxation system in China and find out how individuals can become rich in a Communist country and look at the concentration of wealth.

Considering that the economy of China has grown faster than India's, the important lesson for New Delhi is to rise to match Beijing's growth and not hope to gain ascendency when the former's economy goes down.

As regards the military growth, I endorse the post-1962 policy of the country preparing itself to face any eventuality, but disapprove of statements from various quarters that sound "provocative". Such an attitude is not going to help us. The recent comment by Air Force chief NAK Browne, suggesting that the outcome of the war 50 years ago could have been different had India used its air power was uncalled for.

Regarding the boundary dispute (on which special representatives on both sides have held several rounds of talks), I feel people have to be taken into confidence before taking any decision.

Armed conflict not a solution

conflict with a neighbour is no solution to border problems and differences between countries should be resolved through bilateral talks and cordial relations.

During the 1962 war, the CPI (under the chairmanship of SA Dange) moved a resolution at the National Council, similar to the one adopted by the AICC, saying that Indian soldiers were waging a brave battle to protect our borders and the CPI should extend support to the Nehru government. I was one of the 32 members of the 101 member National Council who opposed the resolution. But we were in minority and the council rejected the resolution.

The then Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda unleashed his forces against us. We were hounded and put in jail.

The fascist, colonialist and imperialist forces were determined to ensure that India and China remain their vassals to carry out their global agenda of dominating us and our resources. India and China should realise this fact and should avoid an armed conflict.

The events that unfolded in India later only validated our resolution that war was not a solution to settle the border dispute with China. Atal Behari Vajpayee and the Jan Sangh supported the war, but when Vajpayee became the Prime Minister, he visited China to buy peace through bilateral talks.

Go for rapid modernisation

anation with disputed borders must be militarily prepared to meet any eventuality at all times. In 1962, we were taken unawares and found wanting in strength and stamina to dispel aggression.

Our failure was four-fold: Grossly inadequate intelligence, both civil and military; fractious parliamentary politics on the unfolding problem with China; diplomacy marked by credulity in early years, inflexibility and petulance in the face of approaching crisis; an unprepared military under flawed military leadership; and political leadership unaware of the country’s military weakness.

Thirtyseven years later, the Kargil conflict again revealed grievous intelligence failure and an inadequately equipped Army. Our politics remains fractious and driven by personal ambitions and parochial considerations. Shortsighted contentions over the Indo-US nuclear deal and unavoidable economic reforms are examples.

Diplomacy has, however, improved. It was good in 1971 and exemplary during Kargil. It is informed by realism and proper understanding of the elasticity of Beijing’s policies characterised by cool calculation; and easy transitions between assertiveness and evasiveness mark the twists and turns of China’s stances on Kashmir and the border issue.

In April 62, I witnessed Krishna Menon asking Russia’s Ambassador to the UN to advise “your Chinese brothers” to stop causing trouble on the frontier or India would deal with them suitably. An empty threat, without the backing of solid power! Most recent writings on 1962 are rooted in a long-gone past. The nature of war has changed. Our Army and Air Force need rapid modernisation. Politics, science, technology and the military must function in much closer sync.

Engagement with powerful China is good policy. There is also the ancient wisdom: Confronted with a stronger power, seek friendship and cooperation of a strong partner with like concerns. Defeated in 1962, India was denied even moral support by the NAM horde!

Match rhetoric with real strength

the most important takeaway from the war is that India's rhetoric should match with real strength. At the time of Independence, India

acquired a status among the comity of nations that was far in excess of its real strength, both in terms of economy and military. The world gradually changed. Such strength had no value and India depended more on rhetoric on China. India continued to challenge China without military strength and that is why we faced the ignominy of defeat. China did what it wanted to and got away with it.

During the last five decades, the Chinese economy has grown three times the size of India's and militarily, India doesn't match the People's Liberation Army of China. Beijing has built infrastructure along the border and New Delhi is no match to it.

In 1959, India had kept quiet when China acquired Tibet, which was a buffer between the two neighbours. Since the Communist takeover, China has had expansionist plans, which are far more evident today than in 1962. We should not remain the poor cousin of China and take steps to match it so it treats us as equal. The world and China’s neighbours are in awe of it, which opens many diplomatic avenues for India. India should also de-classify the Henderson-Brooks report.

Compiled by KV Prasad, Ashok Tuteja, MS Unnikrishnan and Ajay Banerjee

Flashback

October 1950: Chinese troops cross the Sino-Tibetan boundary and move towards Lhasa

April 1954: Agreement on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet region of China signed by Nehru and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou-en-lai

May 1954: China and India sign Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence or Panchsheel

June 1954: Zhou Enlai visits India for the first time

March 1955: India objects to inclusion of a portion of its northern frontier in the official map of China

November 1956: Enlai visits India for the second time on a goodwill mission

September 1958: India objects to the inclusion of a big chunk of northern Assam, NEFA (now Arunachal) in China Pictorial

January 1959: Enlai spells out China’s claims to over 40,000 sq miles of Indian territory in Ladakh, NEFA

April 1959: Dalai Lama escapes from Lhasa and crosses into Indian territory

August 1959: Chinese troops open fire on Indian picket near Migyitun in eastern Ladakh, killing an Indian soldier; also overrun the Indian outpost at Longju in north-eastern Ladakh

September 1959: China refuses to accept the McMahon Line; lays claims to 50,000 sq miles of territory in Sikkim and Bhutan

October 1959: Chinese troops fire on Indian patrol in the Aksai Chin area, killing nine soldiers and capturing 10

April 1960: Meeting in New Delhi between Enlai and Nehru to address boundary dispute ends in deadlock

June 1960: Chinese troops violate the Indian border near Shipki village in the northeast

February 1961: China occupies 12,000 sq miles in the western sector

October 1961: Chinese start aggressive border patrolling; military formations start moving into Indian territory

December 1961: India adopts Forward Policy to stem advancing Chinese frontier line by establishing border outposts

April 1962: China demands withdrawal of Indian frontier personnel from border posts

September 1962: Chinese forces cross the McMahon Line in the Thag La region in the east, open fire on Indian post; launch another intensified attack

October 1962: China launches massive multi-pronged attack along border from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh

November 1962: Massive Chinese attack on eastern front; Tawang, Walong in eastern sector overrun; Rezang La, Chushul airport in west shelled

November 18, 1962: Chinese troops capture Bomdi La in NEFA region

November 21, 1962: China declares ceasefire; announces withdrawal of troops

Tomorrow: China’s world view

For earlier parts of the series on the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian war log on to www.tribuneindia.com

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20121021/pers.htm